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Abstract 
Food safety shocks can threaten the health of consumers, create 
havoc within an industry and result in severe losses to producers. 
Governments often attempt to aid food safety by mandating stan-
dards and inspection of food products to supplement the efforts by 
private firms and industries. This article assesses a form of collec-
tive action that falls between typical government mandates and 
purely private action. The California pistachio industry recently 
established a U.S. federal marketing order, which sets quality stan-
dards and inspection to reduce the likelihood of dangerous or poor 
quality pistachios. Simulation results indicate that, across the full 
range of parameters used in the analysis, the benefit-cost analysis 
was always favorable to the new policy. In the case of California 
pistachios, collective action is likely to be a helpful tool to ensure a 
safe product and increase benefits to producers and consumers. 
Key words 
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Zusammenfassung 
Lebensmittelskandale bedrohen nicht nur die Gesundheit des 
Verbrauchers, sondern verursachen oft auch enorme Verluste bei 
den Produzenten. Zusätzlich zu Initiativen von Firmen und Wirt-
schaftszweigen versuchen Regierungen, den Verbraucherschutz 
durch Produktstandards und Qualitätskontrollen zu gewährleisten. 
Dieser Artikel untersucht eine Form des kollektiven Handelns, die 
zwischen Aktivitäten einzelner Firmen und den Handlungen der 
Regierung angesiedelt werden kann. Die kalifornische Pistazienin-
dustrie hat vor kurzem unter nationalem Recht eine Vermarktungs-
verordnung eingeführt, die durch Qualitätsstandards und Kontrollen 
das Vorkommen gesundheitsschädlicher und minderwertiger Pista-
zien reduzieren soll. Simulationsergebnisse zeigen, dass über das 
gesamte Spektrum der in der Analyse verwendeten Parameter eine 
Nutzen-Kosten-Analyse immer positive Nettoeffekte ergab. Kollekti-
ves Handeln erscheint daher als ein nützliches Instrument für die 
Vermarktung eines gesunden Produktes mit positiven Wohlstands-
effekten für Produzenten und Konsumenten. 
Schlüsselwörter 
Unbedenklichkeit der Nahrungsmittel; Lebensmittelskandal; kollek-
tives Handeln; Vermarktungsregelung; Qualitätsstandards; Pista-
zien; Kalifornien; Nutzen-Kosten-Analyse; Absatzregelung 
1. Introduction 
Outbreaks of foodborne illnesses affect some consumers 
directly and affect both producers and consumers through 
economic relationships. A food safety event can damage an 
individual consumer’s health and the public’s perception of 
a product, which leads to a decrease in demand and finan-
cial losses to the industry.  
Many and varied food scares have occurred in recent years 
in the United States and in other countries. For the period 
from 1990 to 1999, the Center for Science in the Public 
Interest (CSPI, 2002) lists 55 cases in the United States 
alone. Well-known international events have related to 
outbreaks of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in 
Europe, Japan and recently in North America.  
The U.S. government attempts to assure the safety of food 
products by imposing standards and mandating inspection 
and labeling. Individual growers and their commodity asso-
ciations have also responded to increased concerns about 
foodborne illnesses by improving their food safety system. 
Grower organizations have developed testing practices and 
trace-back systems to protect the reputation of their particu-
lar products, often under federal oversight. The U.S. pista-
chio industry offers a recent example. The industry imple-
mented a federal marketing order to mandate tighter quality 
standards and inspection to assure consistency in the quality 
of pistachios. The main provisions of the proposed market-
ing order set standards and require the testing for qua- 
lity and aflatoxin, a cancer-causing mold found in many nuts 
and grains.  
After presenting a background on food safety events and on 
how industries can deal with such issues, this paper ad-
dresses the rationale for collective action in the form of a 
marketing order. We then describe the California pistachio 
industry and the likely economic consequences of the 
newly established federal pistachio marketing order deve--
loped to reduce the chances of a negative food safety event.  
2. Food safety issues 
A food safety event not only endangers the health of con-
sumers but can also have severe economic impacts on the Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 8 
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producer of the affected food product. Negative publicity 
involving a product damages consumer trust in that product 
affecting demand and consequently producer profits. The 
gravity of such an impact depends on the nature of the food 
safety event and on the importance of the affected food 
product in consumer’s diets. These two points also influ-
ence the short and long-term consequences of a particular 
food safety event. Obviously, a food scare that involves 
severe health consequences or even the death of consumers 
is likely to receive more intense and widespread coverage 
by the media. In such instances, the government or industry 
organization might also intervene to recall the affected 
product. Examples of such a case are recent produce-related 
food scares involving cantaloupes and Salmonella and 
strawberries and Cyclospora. Because of potential health 
risks, in 2000, 2001 and 2002 certain cantaloupe brands 
were recalled nationwide (UNITED  STATED  FOOD AND 
DRUG  ADMINISTRATION, 2003). In 1996, the California 
strawberry industry lost an estimated five percent in total 
revenue due to the Cyclospora scare (details can be found 
in CALVIN, 2003).  
Aside from the health impacts of an actual food safety 
event, simply raising the concern of a potential risk can 
have enormous impacts on markets. A well-known event 
demonstrating the public’s sensitivity towards food quality 
was the famous alar scare in apples in 1989, when a televi-
sion broadcast reported that alar (a chemical used to influ-
ence the rate of growth) was used in apple production and 
that it was the most cancer-causing substance in the food 
supply. Apple demand dropped dramatically overnight, and 
apple growers suffered losses estimated at hundreds of 
millions of dollars (details can be found in VAN RAVEN-
SWAAY and HOEHN, 1991).
1 The AMERICAN COUNCIL ON 
SCIENCE AND HEALTH (ACSH, 1999) reported that even 
five years later, the effects from the scare could still be felt 
and that the market had not fully recovered.  
The publicity surrounding a food safety event depends on 
the importance of the affected product in diets and on the 
public perception of the food. It also may depend on who 
consumes the product. The huge furor surrounding the alar 
scare likely derived from the wholesome reputation and 
every day nature of apples and their importance in the diet 
of children. Food scares involving products that are con-
sumed on a less frequent basis by fewer consumers might 
receive less media coverage. However, the economic con-
sequences of a food scare involving a less common product, 
pistachios for example, may be even more severe within the 
industry if the product has a less familiar place within the 
diet and other products are potential substitutes.  
Industries affected by food scares may bear long-term con-
sequences of the negative publicity. Public statements by 
producers or governments to assure the public of safe food 
supplies are often ineffective in restoring consumer confi-
dence in the product following the discovery of a food 
safety problem (SMITH, VAN RAVENSWAAY and THOMPSON, 
1988). Thus, the impacts of food safety problems depend to 
a large extent on the intensity of the media coverage and the 
                                                           
1   Additional studies of demand impact of food safety events and 
information on demand can be found in BROWN and 
SCHRADER (1990), RICHARDS and PATTERSON (1999) and PIG-
GOTT and MARSH (2004). 
basic theme of that coverage. Frequent and negative cover-
age of a food safety problem has a larger effect on the de-
mand for the affected product and that effect can only par-
tially be compensated by positive coverage from govern-
mental or industry sources.  
3.  Aflatoxins in pistachios 
Aflatoxicosis is poisoning that results from ingestion of 
aflatoxins in contaminated food or feed.
2 The aflatoxins are 
a group of structurally related toxic compounds produced 
by certain strains of the fungi Aspergillus flavus and A. 
parasiticus. Under favorable conditions of temperature and 
humidity, these fungi grow on certain foods and feeds, 
resulting in the production of aflatoxins. The most pro-
nounced contamination has been encountered in tree nuts, 
peanuts, and other oilseeds, including corn and cottonseed. 
Aflatoxins produce acute necrosis, cirrhosis, and carcinoma 
of the liver in a number of animal species, and it is logical 
to assume that humans may be similarly affected. Aflatoxi-
cosis in humans has rarely been reported; however, such 
cases are not always recognized. One of the most important 
accounts of aflatoxicosis in humans occurred in more than 
150 villages in adjacent districts of two neighboring states 
in northwest India in the fall of 1974. According to one 
report of this outbreak, 397 persons were affected and 108 
persons died. A 10-year follow-up of the Indian outbreak 
found the survivors fully recovered with no ill effects from 
the experience. In rich countries, aflatoxin contamination 
rarely occurs in foods at levels that cause acute aflatoxico-
sis in humans, but there have been aflatoxin events in pista-
chios that violated government standards and caused nega-
tive demand shocks.  
Pistachios can be contaminated with the mold containing 
aflatoxins if practices during the harvest or storage allow 
the nuts to become wet or get in contact with dirt. Moderate 
temperatures, high humidity and poor ventilation during 
storage lead to a corresponding increase in the volume of 
the toxin.  
Iranian pistachio imports were banned in the European 
Union (EU) in September 1997 because of excessive levels 
of aflatoxins in Iranian pistachio shipments (THE ECONO-
MIST, 1997). The ban lasted for nearly three months, and 
was lifted in December of 1997 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION: 
FOOD AND VETERINARY OFFICE, 1998). However, the de-
mand for pistachios was affected for a longer period. The 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) presents data showing that imports into the Euro-
pean Union dropped 42% from 102 698 metric tons in 1997 
to 59 619 metric tons in 1998.  
In 1997, an importing year that was shortened by the ban, 
Germany imported 47 494 metric tons of pistachios worth 
$175.3 million (FAO), and the five-year average leading up 
to that year (1993-1997) was 43  459  metric  tons per year 
(FAO). In 1998, Germany imported only 18 937 metric tons, 
just 40% of the quantity in the previous year (figure 1). 
German imports during the next two years were also well 
below 1997 quantities. In 1999, 27  059  metric  tons were 
                                                           
2    Much of the technical information here is from UNITED 
STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CENTER FOR FOOD 
SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION (2004). Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 8 
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imported and in 2000 only 25 090 metric tons. The value of 
the imports fell to $78.9 million, or just 45% of the value in 
1997. This drastic and protracted fall in the quantity of 
imports after the ban was lifted points to a decrease in con-
sumption, perhaps resulting from negative publicity the ban 
received in the media. In 1999, HERMES sampled pistachios 
from supermarkets for Öko-Test, a German consumer re-
port, and found that eight out of eleven samples had higher 
than allowed aflatoxin levels, and that the highest levels 
were found in Californian pistachios.  
In the years since 1997, pistachios have exceeded maxi-
mum aflatoxin levels on several occasions and in several 
countries. This has made headlines worldwide. In 2000, in 
Germany alone, several articles were published in national 
(DER  SPIEGEL, 2000; SÜDDEUTSCHE  ZEITUNG, 2000) and 
regional newspapers, following findings of high aflatoxin 
levels in pistachio ice cream. Surveys of industry and gov-
ernment information indicates the continued appearance of 
high levels of aflatoxins in countries worldwide (REINECKE, 
2002). For example, one case in Australia dealt with the 
recall of pistachios following the detection of high levels of 
aflatoxins. In February of 2000, health officials in Japan 
found high levels of aflatoxin in pistachios, which resulted 
in a recall of the product. Retailers were questioning pista-
chios from Iran and California. Also in 2000, testing in 
France found high levels of aflatoxins in pistachios. 
A recent report noted that “the European Union extends its 
deadline for Iran to clean up its pistachios. With the strictest 
standard for aflatoxin levels – 4 ppb – compared with   
10-15 ppb in other importing nations, the EU would like to 
cut back on its current level of 100% pistachio inspections 
and so it extends its deadline for six months and offers   
Iran its technical services to find a solution” (WILLARD 
THOMPSON’S FIELD TALK, 2004). 
The impact of the 1997 food safety event involving pista-
chios in Europe was severe in the short term and in the 
longer term. As described above, pistachios are not a typi-
cal ingredient of an everyday diet for most Europeans, but 
rather, a snack food consumed at irregular intervals. Be-
cause of the specialized demand and close substitutability 
with other nuts and snack foods, the losses for pistachios in 
the EU market were larger than observed in some other 
food scares in the United States. Other differences related 
to institutions and consumer behavior between the United 
States and Europe may also help to explain differences in 
responses to food scares.  
4.  Government and industry responses to 
food safety issues 
In the United States as elsewhere, national legislation and 
regulation addresses food safety issues. In the United 
States, federal agencies, often in collabora-
tion with their counterparts at the state level, 
are charged with protecting consumers 
against impure, unsafe and fraudulently 
labeled foods. The Food Safety and Inspec-
tion Service (FSIS) of the United States 
Department of Agriculture, for example, has 
the responsibility to ensure that meat, poul-
try and egg products are safe and accurately 
labeled (FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
2000). FSIS operates under the authority of 
the Federal Meat Inspection Act and sets 
public health performance standards for food 
safety. It regulates all raw and processed 
meat, poultry products and egg products sold 
in U.S. interstate and foreign commerce. 
Another agency, outside of USDA, the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates 
the use of food additives or drug residues in 
food items. The FDA also sets tolerance levels for pesticide 
residues or foodborne toxins. 
Industries and firms also invest resources to prevent patho-
gens, carcinogenic chemicals and other harmful substances 
from entering their food products. Incentives to comply 
with the mandated regulations and to invest in additional 
food safety measures include the benefits of the reputation 
for supplying safe products and the fear of legal action from 
the sale of potentially harmful products. However, firms 
may have an incentive to underinvest in safety if there are 
industry-wide reputational externalities or if regulations are 
imperfectly enforced.  
Several U.S. commodity industries have collective action 
programs supported by federal or state legislation. These 
programs are industry-initiated and financed by product-
specific assessments. Initiation requires a positive vote by 
growers representing a majority of the industry. Once ap-
proved by the industry and by regulators the rules and as-
sessments are mandated and enforced by the government on 
all industry participants. Continuation of a marketing order 
requires positive support by the industry in votes held peri-
odically. Below we provide more specifics on the new U.S. 
marketing order for pistachios.  
State marketing orders are authorized by the California 
Marketing Act of 1937, whereas commodity commissions 
and councils are instituted by specific laws. Each adminis-
trative body is authorized to collect assessments from pro-
ducers and, in some cases, handlers, based on units or value 
of the commodity at the first-handler level. These assess-
ments are used to fund activities, which may include quan-
tity controls, market promotion, research and development, 
container or pack regulations, and quality standards and 
inspection. Although the largest and most important pro-
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grams relate to dairy, the majority of California’s state 
marketing programs are for fruits, nuts, and vegetables, and 
the lion’s share of the expenditure is for promotion pro-
grams in most cases, although not in every case. 
Federal marketing orders are authorized by the Agricultural 
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. They are similar to state 
marketing orders, and the enabling legislation was enacted 
at nearly the same time, but there are some differences. 
Federal marketing orders tend to focus on quality regula-
tions, and sometimes volume controls, while state programs 
tend to focus more on research and promotion. Federal 
marketing orders that set standards for quality and related 
requirements are in place for many California fruits and 
vegetables. In addition, the USDA provides testing and 
grading services for many commodity markets (USDA-
AMS, 2003). 
The majority of marketing orders in the United States do 
not directly regulate the price and quantity. They instead 
facilitate research and promotion of a commodity or impose 
safety or quality standards as in the case of pistachios. Such 
measures indirectly affect the price and quantity of a com-
modity. Dairy marketing orders are important exceptions. 
They set minimum prices in order to price discriminate 
across end-uses of milk and regulate location of marketing.  
Most of the budget and related activity for these programs 
relate to product promotion, research, supply control and 
pricing, and general quality issues. However, some of the 
programs deal with food safety. LEE et al. (1996) docu-
mented and described the different forms of mandated mar-
keting programs in California and their legal basis, as well 
as the amounts spent under each program and the allocation 
between research, promotion, and other activities. They 
reported that in May 1995 there were 48 state marketing 
programs (including state marketing orders, commissions, 
and councils) and a further 13 federal marketing orders in 
California, covering about half of California’s agricultural 
production and spending more than $100 million. Since 
then, there have been some changes in the programs, and 
the total program spending has grown to more than $170 
million in 2002/03. Extensive background information on 
California marketing orders and commodity programs can 
be found in KAISER et al. (forthcoming 2004). 
5.  Economic rationale for collective action 
relevant to food standards 
Mandated collective action programs, such as the California 
Pistachio Commission and the federal California pistachio 
marketing order, use the coercive powers of the state or 
federal government to oblige individual producers to par-
ticipate and contribute assessments. The programs are vol-
untary in the sense that their establishment requires the 
support of a sufficiently large majority of producers, but 
they do not require unanimous support. And, unlike truly 
voluntary collective action programs, such as cooperatives 
or clubs, once they have been established, these programs 
are mandatory for all producers of the commodity in the 
defined area.  
The conventional in-principle economic justification for the 
use of the government’s taxing and regulatory powers in 
this fashion is that there are collective goods within the 
industry – research, promotion, grade standards, packing 
regulations, public relations, and the like - that will be un-
dersupplied otherwise. This is the standard public-good 
argument for government intervention. The goods in ques-
tion are public goods, in the sense that they are non-rival 
and non-price excludable, but these public-good benefits 
are confined to the producers and consumers of a particular 
commodity, and are associated with consumption or pro-
duction of the commodity. The collective goods could be 
provided using the general revenues of the relevant state or 
national government, but it is likely to be fairer and more 
efficient to finance their provision using a tax on the com-
modity with which the collective goods are associated.  
Standardized grades and packaging have a public good role 
in that they will reduce transaction costs (e.g., see FREE-
BAIRN, 1967, 1973). An argument for quality regulation can 
be made where quality is hidden and the market can be 
spoiled as a result of the distortions in incentives to provide 
and communicate information about quality (e.g., AKER-
LOF, 1970). The “public good” element is that when con-
sumers experience the quality of pistachios from one sup-
plier, this affects their subsequent demand for pistachios 
from other suppliers as well. Especially in the case of a 
food quality issue, a bad experience associated with any 
pistachios will likely affect the whole industry and the im-
pacts can be large and long lasting, but individual producers 
will not take these industry-wide consequences of their 
actions entirely into account. Therefore, the private incen-
tive to assure high quality products that are perceived as 
safe does not reflect the full, industry-wide or public benefit 
of these actions. In such cases, voluntary actions, motivated 
by private incentives will provide less safety and quality 
assurance than would be in the interest of the industry (and 
the general consuming public). In this case, all farms and 
firms would benefit from a stronger reputation for pista-
chios in general, but their own actions cannot assure such a 
reputation, unless the rest of the industry matches those 
actions. Individual farms and firms have the private incen-
tive to keep their own direct costs low and invest less in 
safety testing and quality assurance than would be optimal 
from the view of the whole market. This is a classic “free-
rider” problem where individuals cannot be precluded from 
sharing in the benefits even if they fail to make contribu-
tions, and where one individual benefiting from the better 
reputation does not preclude benefits to others. For a more 
de-tailed discussion of the economic rational for collective 
action, see ALSTON et al. (2004). 
Regulations over visual standards – such as freedom from 
blemishes or minimum size regulations – are less easy to 
justify, generally, on the grounds of public goods since they 
relate to aspects of quality that are not hidden from con-
sumers. Such regulations may play a role of de facto supply 
control by diverting some of the volume to non-food uses. 
They may also be a form of de facto price discrimination by 
diverting a larger proportion of the crop (for example, pis-
tachios) to the processing market, which has a more elastic 
demand response.
3  
                                                           
3   ALSTON et al. (1995) analyze the impacts of the allocated 
reserve policy applied by the Almond Board of California un-
der a federal marketing order, an example of this type of sup-
ply control, which can be mimicked by the use of quality regu-
lations to divert some fraction of production from the market. 
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6.  The California pistachio industry 
World production of pistachios has grown rapidly during 
the past 20 years, and U.S. production has increased as a 
share of that growing total. Iran is still the largest producer 
but the United States is established as the second-largest 
pistachio producer in the world, followed by Syria and 
Turkey and is now the second-largest exporter after Iran.
4  
Almost all US pistachios are produced in California.
5 Cali-
fornia’s production has grown more than 200-fold since 
1976, when its first commercial crop of 1.5 million pounds 
were harvested.
6 Table 1 presents time-series data on the 
industry. Normally it takes a pistachio tree 7-8 years to 
mature before it produces an economically significant crop, 
and 12-15 years to reach full potential (CALIFORNIA PISTA-
CHIO  COMMISSION, 2002). The longer-term trends have 
shown steadily growing acreage, yields, quantity, and value 
of production, and corresponding downward trends in 
prices, with important fluctuations around those trends. The 
growth in area and production has been steady for the past 
                                                                                                 
of de facto price discrimination associated with grade stan-
dards in the California prune industry.  
4   Iran’s exports peaked in 1996 when it exported 308 million 
pounds of pistachios, but fell to 127 million pounds in 1997, 
when Iranian pistachios were banned in the European Union 
because of aflatoxins. Iranian exports returned gradually to 
near pre-ban levels in the following few years. 
5    In 2000, Arizona had 2,700 acres and produced 4 million 
pounds of pistachios, just 1.5% of national production in that 
year (AASS, 2003), and too small to have significant impacts 
on the national market for pistachios. New Mexico had 391 
acres of pistachios in 1999, less than half a percent of total 
acreage (NEW MEXICO AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS, 2003). 
6   Pistachios exhibit alternate bearing with low yields tending to 
follow high yields, thus 2001 was a relatively low-yield, low-
production year. The yield cycle is an important factor in 
quantity produced, price received, total value of the crop, and 
gross revenue per bearing acre. 
22 years and is expected to continue, with non-bearing 
acreage having reached 23 000 acres in 2002 (CALIFORNIA 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICAL SERVICE, 2002). The trend for 
the past 22 years in price per pound (even in nominal terms) 
has trended gradually downward from the high in 1980 of 
$2.05 a pound to $1.11 per pound in 2002. We have also 
seen steady growth in California exports as a share of world 
trade and California exports as a share of production.  
7.  The new marketing order for California 
pistachios 
In order to establish a marketing order, an industry must 
first submit a preliminary proposal to USDA that indicates 
the degree of industry support and the problem the program 
would address. Next, if the preliminary proposal is ac-
cepted, USDA conducts a hearing at which opponents, 
proponents and others are allowed to testify. The proponent 
group bears the burden of proof of positive benefits to the 
industry and consumers. In addition, for a positive ruling, 
the hearing record must generally 
include evidence that the proposed 
marketing order will not disadvan-
tage small businesses and generally 
has widespread support. Based on 
the evidence from the hearing, the 
USDA issues a recommended deci-
sion and then, after allowing time for 
comment, a positive final decision by 
USDA allows the proposed order to 
be put to a grower referendum. Fi-
nally, at least two-thirds of the grow-
ers voting by number or by volume 
represented must approve the pro-
posal before the Secretary of Agri-
culture can issue the marketing order.  
The pistachio industry spent several 
years preparing to submit its mar-
keting order proposal and was suc-
cessful in making its case to the 
USDA. In July of 2002, hearings 
were held in Fresno, California on a 
proposal to establish a federal mar-
keting order for pistachios grown in 
California. The hearing included economic testimony based 
on analysis by SUMNER, which supported the argument that 
the order would benefit producers and consumers and not 
burden small businesses (2002). After the hearing, the pro-
posed order was recommended by the USDA-AMS and 
released for comment in 2003 and grower vote in 2004. On 
March 1, 2004, the USDA-AMS reported that valid ballots 
representing 338 California pistachio producers were cast. 
Of those voting in the referendum, 90.8% favored establish-
ing the order (these voters represented 90% of the total 
volume of production voted in the referendum). Overall the 
process took more than three years from the beginning of 
active preparation to approval.
7 Producers are required to 
                                                           
7   The order was scheduled to become effective on August 1, 
2004. Upon a request of the California pistachio industry, the 
USDA-AMS moved the implementation date for the regula-
tions to Feb. 1, 2005. 
Table 1.   Data on California pistachio area, production, yield, and value, 
1980-2002 
Bearing Non-bearing Production  Yield  Value  Avg  Return 
Year 
(acres)  (mil lbs)  (lbs/acre)  (mil $)  ($/lbs) 
1980 25,773  8,989  27.2  1,055  55.8  2.05 
1985 32,332  18,739  27.3  838  36.6  1.37 
1990 53,700  11,100  117.3  2,375  129.6  1.02 
1991 55,700  13,300  76.4  1,465  100.7  1.25 
1992 56,500  13,900  146.5  2,592  150.9  1.03 
1993 57,000  15,700  150.9  2,648  161.5  1.07 
1994 57,507  16,633  128.3  2,232  118.1  0.92 
1995 60,300  13,400  147.7  2,449  160.9  1.09 
1996 64,300  17,100  104.3  1,622  121.0  1.16 
1997 65,373  17,062  179.5  2,746  202.9  1.13 
1998 68,000  19,300  187.5  2,757  193.1  1.03 
1999 71,000  21,000  122.4  1,724  162.8  1.33 
2000 74,578  21,730  241.6  3,239  239.2  1.01 
2001 78,000  23,500  160.3  2,055  166.7  1.01 
2002 83,000  23,000  302.4  3,644  335.7  1.11 
Source:   CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL STATISTICAL SERVICE (2002);  
CALIFORNIA PISTACHIO COMMISSION (2002)Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 8 
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conduct a referendum every six years to ascertain continu-
ance of the marketing order. The marketing order will be 
eliminated if the provisions are not favored by a two thirds 
majority of voting producers or a two thirds majority of 
volume represented. 
Under the new pistachio marketing order no handler may 
ship for domestic human consumption pistachios that ex-
ceed an aflatoxin level of 15 parts per billion (ppb).
8 The 
marketing order further outlines the procedures for afla-
toxin testing necessary to obtain an aflatoxin inspection 
certificate. The aim is to be able to trace every certified lot 
of an individual handler from testing through to shipment 
(FEDERAL REGISTER, 2004). The marketing order imposes 
similar testing and certification requirements to ensure the 
quality of the product through maximum defect levels and 
minimum size levels.  
Maximum aflatoxin standards, inspection and certification 
have a food-safety role, as well as an industry collective 
good element, because aflatoxin is a serious, and in some 
cases, deadly poison. However, the standards proposed by 
the marketing order are in addition to and tighter than those 
the U.S. government already has in place for food safety. 
An industry-wide food safety issue could arise as a result of 
evidence of death or illness associated with consumption of 
pistachios containing aflatoxin. As with other food scares, 
there may be consequences for demand experienced 
throughout the industry, not just by the firms directly re-
sponsible for the incidents in question. The same type of 
market problem can arise even without a case of actual food 
poisoning. It could result from an actual aflatoxin event 
involving the discovery of aflatoxin in excess of the 20 
parts per billion allowed by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion. Even in the absence of an aflatoxin event in pistachios, 
there may be adverse effects on the pistachio market from 
the perception of such a threat based on adverse publicity 
associating aflatoxin with pistachios. Negative conse-
quences could result from three channels: a) negative per-
ceptions among final consumers resulting in them choosing 
not to purchase products; b) negative perceptions among 
market middlemen such as retailers resulting in them 
choosing not to stock a product that might be subject to 
recall or lawsuits; or c) from governments choosing not to 
allow products to be sold because of heightened concerns 
over food safety.  
Two characteristics of the pistachio market make the indus-
try-wide collective good concerns particularly important in 
the context of food safety assurances and quality standards. 
First, as with many fresh fruits and nuts, there is little if any 
brand identification with pistachios. Thus, a customer who 
has an unsatisfying experience with a purchase of pista-
chios or who hears negative news about the safety of con-
suming pistachios is unlikely to associate this with a spe-
cific brand or supplier. Unlike branded, packaged consumer  
 
                                                           
8   This is a tighter standard than the current maximum allowed 
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of 20 ppb. 
The marketing order applies to pistachios shipped to the   
domestic market only, but often processors already tested   
the pistachios destined for exports, because international   
standards are stricter than in the United States. The maximum 
level for pistachios shipped to the European Union, for exam-
ple, is 4 ppb.  
items, any negative news would not just affect a specific 
supplier, but rather would affect the industry at large. Sec-
ond, many pistachio purchasers have only begun to con-
sume pistachios recently. They consume the product infre-
quently, purchase relatively small quantities, and have rela-
tively little knowledge about pistachios. One would there-
fore expect the industry-wide reaction to an aflatoxin event 
in pistachios to be large, compared with more familiar 
foods, especially in the context of food safety concerns. The 
wholesale trade would be even more sensitive to an event if 
a recall were necessary. 
The result of this reasoning is that the pistachio industry 
had strong in-principle reasons for acting collectively to 
assure industry-wide compliance with quality and food 
safety standards. But this is only an in-principle case. 
Whether collective action of this type would provide net 
benefits to the industry depends also on how effective the 
program would be in reducing the likelihood of a food 
scare, or its severity, and on the costs of the program.  
8.  Model 
In GRAY et al. (2004) we provide details on a multi-period 
stochastic simulation model of the pistachios market. Al-
though there is not space in the present article to provide 
details on the model itself we can suggest the essence of the 
relationships using a simple static representation of how the 
supply and demand functions are affected by the marketing 
order. 
In figure 2, SD represents the supply of US pistachios to the 
domestic market. Marginal cost rises from SD
0 to SD
1 be-
cause of the required testing under the marketing orders. 
Domestic demand shifts out from DD
0 to DD
1 to reflect the 
reduced likelihood of a food safety event, the improved 
quality and improved consumer confidence from USDA 
certification. Note that export supply SX
0 and export de-
mand DX
0 do not shift because new rules do not apply. The 
figure is not drawn to scale and sizes of shifts are exagger-
ated to be visible. Furthermore, total demand and total sup-
ply are not shown to avoid clutter. 
The figure does not deal with supply dynamics, storage 
demand and the impact of the marketing order on export 
demand. Nor does it give a sense of the complex price   
and quantity dynamics that follow from stochastic demand 
shocks, perennial crop supply response and alternate bearing. 
All these issues are dealt with in the full simulation   
model.  
The GRAY et al. (2004) model is used to simulate the mar-
kets of California pistachios and project prices, quantities 
and welfare aggregates of pistachios for 50 years into the 
future, beginning in the year 2000. Yields vary over time to 
reflect trends, alternate bearing and random influences. 
Aflatoxin events also occur at random. Both the probability 
of an event and the severity of the demand response to a 
given event are lower with the marketing order in place. For 
each “draw” of a time series of future yields, the model is 
used to simulate the outcomes for economic variables in the 
industry with or without the marketing order in place. The 
effects of the marketing order on measures of interest are 
determined by considering 100 draws of future time paths 
of yields for expected values and the range of outcomes (or 
other measures of variability).  Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 8 
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Equations representing the domestic and export demands 
for pistachios and storage demand are specified using esti-
mates of elasticities and data on market shares, quantities 
and prices. The proposed marketing order affects the de-
mand for pistachios by reducing the probability of 
an aflatoxin event and the severity of the demand 
response to a given event, as well as by providing 
higher average quality to the market and USDA 
certification about these improvements. The intro-
duction of the marketing order also affects producer 
and processor costs. These additional costs relate 
mainly to aflatoxin testing and meeting quality 
standards. To pay for itself, the marketing order 
must generate a demand response sufficient to off-
set the added costs. 
Simulation results, discussed next, illustrate the 
orders of magnitude of the impacts under a range of 
parameter values. These give a quantitative sense of 
the relationships. 
9.  Simulated impacts of the  
pistachio marketing order  
To estimate the impact of the marketing order we 
computed and compared a pair of fifty-year simula-
tions (i.e., one with and one without the marketing 
order) using the “baseline” values for the parame-
ters, as shown in table 2. For each year of the fifty-
year simulation, the model determines a market-
clearing price, bearing acres, acres planted, yield, 
production, domestic quantity demanded, export 
quantity demanded, ending stocks, revenue, and consumer 
surplus. To capture the effects of random yield variability 
and aflatoxin-related demand shocks, the 50 years of simu-
lated equilibrium values were calculated for a set of 100 
equally likely futures, which differ in terms of values for 
randomly generated yields and aflatoxin shocks. Hence, in 
a given scenario, each simulated variable of interest has a 
fifty-year time path, with a random distribution in each 
period, which is affected by the marketing order. It 
is important to keep this time path and the random 
nature of the variables in mind.  
Table 2 provides one set of parameters under which 
the marketing order reduces the annual probability 
of an aflatoxin event from 4% to 2%, and reduces 
the demand impact of such an event by half from an 
initial drop of 30% in demand to 15%. In addition, 
in the case presented in table 2, the marketing order 
increases domestic consumer willingness to pay for 
pistachios by 1 cent per pound to reflect additional 
confidence and improved quality. The cost of com-
pliance with the marketing order, 0.525 cents per 
pound consumed domestically, is reflected as an 
increased cost for domestic sales. The cost data are 
based on detailed surveys of growers and industry 
information on specific costs of individual compo-
nents of the newly required procedures (SUMNER, 
2002). We have much less information on the de-
mand parameters. The values shown were derived 
from consideration of other recent foodborne illness 
events and the responses of pistachio demand to the 
European aflatoxin finding in pistachios. In addi-
tion, we considered aspects of the pistachio demand dis-
cussed above. Considerable sensitivity testing of results 
was conducted to reflect the potential range of values for 
these demand parameters. 
Table 3 reports the impacts of the marketing order in the 
first column of numbers. To summarize the effects of the 
marketing order over the 50-year simulation we report av-
erage effects over the 50 years for some variables and for 
others we report the net present value in 2003 of the effects 
over the 50 years. The policy would modestly increase the 
average price received by growers (0.6%), along with the 
average number of bearing acres (1.3%) and production 
Table 2.   Key parameters for the simulation model 
Parameter Baseline  Value 
Underlying market conditions 
Elasticity of domestic demand   -1.00 
Elasticity of export demand   -3.30 
Elasticity of demand for stocks  -2.00 
Long-run annual growth rate of demand (percent)  3.60 
Elasticity of new plantings response to profitability  1.00 
Impact parameters without a marketing order 
Probability of an aflatoxin event (percent per year)  4.00 
Initial impacts of an event  
(percentage reduction in domestic demand)  30.00 
Foreign demand shock/ domestic demand shock 
(percent)  21.50 
Impact parameters with a marketing order 
Probability of an aflatoxin event (percent per year)  2.00 
Initial impacts of an event  
(percentage reduction in domestic demand)  15.00 
Initial impacts of an event  
(percentage reduction in foreign demand)  21.50 
Compliance costs (cents per pound)  0.525 
Domestic demand enhancement from certification 
(cents per pound)  1.00 
Source: authors’ compilation 
Figure 2.   Simplified illustration of the supply and demand 
relationships in the market for US pistachios 























Source: author Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 8 
341 
(1.5%). These increases in production are associated gener-
ally with increases in domestic consumption (2.8%) and in 
exports (0.2%) and decreases in stocks (0.3%). These aver-
ages mask the fact that, as noted above, the effects on some 
of these variables change over time (the production re-
sponse to the policy increases with time whereas the do-
mestic demand response begins immediately) and from year 
to year (through the interaction of policy-induced changes 
in bearing acreage and variable yields). This is true in par-
ticular for the effects of the policy on exports – the small 
average effects reflect negative impacts in some years, 
especially initially, and positive impacts in others, espe-
cially in the later years.  
The net benefits from the policy – reflecting the conse-
quences of both the assessment and regulations, and the 
demand and supply responses to them – are expressed as 
present values (in 2003) of changes in economic surplus 
accruing to different groups. These net benefits include 
$68.9 million to domestic producers and $165.4 million to 
domestic consumers, yielding a total national net benefit of 
$234.2 million.
9 From a global perspective, the U.S. net 
benefits are slightly offset by net losses in foreigner surplus 
(the “consumer surplus” measured off the demand for U.S. 
exports) worth $25.0 million, leaving global net benefits 
with a present value in 2003 equal to $209.2 million.
10  
                                                           
9   On 78 000 bearing acres in 2001, the producer benefit is worth 
$2 120 per acre, but the benefits would not be confined to these 
acres. 
10   The positive effect on export quantity seems to contradict the 
higher average price and the reduction in foreign “consumer” 
surplus associated with the policy. The effect on foreign “con-
We also estimated the total cost of the policy (in terms of 
expenditure incurred by processors in compliance) which 
had a present value in 2003 of $36.7 million. The initial 
incidence of this cost is on processors, but this incidence is 
redistributed through supply and demand responses. To 
evaluate the final incidence, we ran a simulation with just 
the assessment (modeled as a reduction in domestic buyers’ 
willingness to pay of 0.525 cents per pound). In present 
value terms, we found that 15% of the cost was borne by 
growers, 85% by domestic and foreign consumers com-
bined, and 95% by domestic consumers (foreign consumers 
are net beneficiaries of a tax on domestic consumers). 
Hence, the incidence of the global cost of $36.7 million was 
$39.7 million on the United States, 
including $5.5 million on U.S. produc-
ers. Conventional benefit-cost ratios 
(B/C) are as follows: domestic produc-
ers (13.5), the United States as whole 
(6.9) and the world as a whole (6.7).  
Simulations of high impact and low 
impact scenarios are reported in the 
second and the third columns of num-
bers in table 3. For the high-impact 
scenario we altered most of the parame-
ters of the model by 10% in the direc-
tion that would increase the impact of 
the policy; for the low-impact scenario 
we altered the parameters by 10% in the 
opposite direction. These scenarios 
reveal how the results would be af-
fected by a modest but consistent up-
ward or downward bias in parameter 
values. As shown at the bottom of the 
table the combined effect of the pa-
rameter changes creates a larger than 
10% variation in the estimated impacts 
of the marketing order. Compared with 
a benefit-cost ratio for producers of 
13.5 in the base scenario, the ratio is 
20.8 in the high-impact scenario and 
9.6 in the low-impact scenario. Simi-
larly for the United States as a whole, 
the ratio is 10.2 in the high-impact 
scenario and 3.8 in the low-impact 
scenario. Nevertheless, the benefit-cost ratios are all well 
greater than zero, even in the low-impact scenario, indicat-
ing that the policy entails substantial net benefits for both 
producers and the nation as a whole.  
                                                                                                 
sumer” surplus is complicated. First, there are some benefits to 
foreigners from the policy because in the baseline, there is a 
spillover of an aflatoxin event from U.S. demand to foreign 
demand and the policy-induced reduction in probability and 
severity of an aflatoxin event applies to export markets as well 
as domestically. These benefits are offset at least somewhat by 
the larger domestic demand responses, driving up prices, es-
pecially in the early years; in the later years those effects in 
turn are offset at least somewhat by the consequences of U.S. 
supply response to the policy. The benefits to foreigners are 
greater in the earlier years, and given discounting, the net pre-
sent value is negative even though the average effect on quan-
tity of exports, undiscounted, is slightly positive. 
Table 3.   Simulation results: benefit cost analysis of the pistachio 
marketing order 




Average of annual values, 2000-2050, induced changes in  
Price of California pistachios (real cents per 
pound)  0.501 0.726 0.371 
Bearing area of California pistachios (acres)  1,866  2,716  1,279 
Production of California pistachios (million 
pounds)  12.55 18.31  8.63 
Domestic consumption of California pistachios 
(million pounds)  11.54 16.91  8.15 
Exports of California pistachios (million pounds)  1.01  1.40  0.51 
Stocks of California pistachios (million pounds)  -0.62  -1.05  -0.47 
Present values in year 2000, net benefits, $million 
Changes in U.S. consumer surplus (CS)  165.4  246.7  109.8 
Changes in California producer surplus (PS)  68.9  103.7  49.6 
National benefits (NS = CS+PS)  234.3  350.4  159.4 
Net changes in foreign surplus  (FS)  -25.0 -36.5 -19.2 
Global net benefits (GS = NS+FS)  209.3  313.9  140.2 
Present values in year 2003, costs of marketing order, $million 
Cost of compliance (CC)  36.7  34.9  38.4 
Benefit-cost ratios 
Global B/C ratio (1+ [GS/CC])  6.7  10.0  4.7 
National B/C ratio (1 + [NS/1.1CC])  6.9 10.2 4.8 
Grower B/C ratio (1+ PS/0.15CC])  13.5  20.8  9.6 
Source: authors’ calculations based on simulation results Agrarwirtschaft 53 (2004), Heft 8 
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10. Conclusion 
Food scares can damage the health of consumers.   
Depending on the nature of the scare and the affected   
product, consumer trust in the product and demand for the 
product both fall affecting producer and consumer well-
being. 
Governments regulate food production and marketing   
by imposing standards and inspection requirements. Indus-
tries also undertake voluntary actions, which determine 
standards or similar measures for a product. However,   
such voluntary industry actions and agreements between 
market participants face free-rider problems. Individual 
members of an industry often have the private incentive to 
invest less in safety testing and quality assurance than 
would be optimal from the view of the whole market. One 
response to this free-rider problem is collective industry 
action under a government mandate in the form of a   
marketing order.  
A useful example of such collective action is the newly 
introduced marketing order for California pistachios. An 
aflatoxin-related food safety event could impose serious 
costs on the pistachio industry. The marketing order is 
intended to reduce the odds of an event, mitigate the conse-
quences if an event should occur, provide some quality 
assurance to buyers, and offset the negative consequences 
of concerns over the potential for a food scare affecting 
pistachios. In this study we have modeled the market for 
California pistachios to provide an ex ante assessment of 
the benefits and costs and other consequences of the mar-
keting order looking forward for 50 years from its introduc-
tion in 2004. Our approach uses a stochastic dynamic simu-
lation of the industry under scenarios with and without the 
marketing order in place, to compare the stream of simu-
lated outcomes and the consequences for measures of eco-
nomic welfare of producers in the industry, consumers, the 
nation as a whole, and globally.  
Assessing the implications of the marketing order   
requires incorporating into the simulation a number of   
parameters representing the odds of an aflatoxin event,   
its consequences for demand, and the extent to which   
a marketing order would reduce those magnitudes.   
Many of these parameters are hard to estimate because 
relevant historical data are not available on pistachios.   
As well as simulating the consequences implied by   
median values for key parameters, we undertook sensitivity 
analysis. Across the full range of parameters used   
in the analysis, the benefit-cost analysis was always   
favorable to the policy: the measured benefits to producers, 
the nation, or the world always well exceeded the   
corresponding measure of costs, typically by many   
times. The benefit-cost ratios were generally greater than 
5:1 and often greater than 10:1, which means there is   
substantial leeway to accommodate potential errors in   
assumptions and yet have favorable findings. In present 
value terms, the benefits to producers were estimated at 
$68.9 million. Two-thirds of the total benefits ($165.4 mil-
lion) would accrue to domestic consumers. These are   
significant values, and are large relative to the costs of 
compliance with the program.  
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